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 (Re) making matter: design and selection 
 
The notion of complete understanding controlling action is an ideal in the 
clouds, grotesquely at variance with practical life (Whitehead, 1956, 114-115) 
Introduction 
Hannah Arendt opens her major work, The Human Condition (1958), with an 
evocative meditation on the launch and orbit of the Sputnik rocket. She suggests that 
the success of the Sputnik shows: 
 
That men everywhere are by no means slow to catch up and adjust to scientific 
discoveries and technical developments, but that, on the contrary, they have 
outsped them by decades. Here, as in other respects, science has realised and 
affirmed what men anticipated in dreams that were neither wild nor idle. (p. 1) 
 
For Arendt, science and culture are intimately interwoven. Science is ‗anticipated in 
dreams‘; in science-fiction writing, film and vernacular culture. This dreaming 
provides both the rationale for experimentation and technical development, and the 
cultural and cognitive frames in which to situate emerging technologies. Arendt 
evokes something of Benjamin‘s sense of the dream-state (see Buck-Morss 1989) in 
which the imaginative and the material are complexly wrapped in the dynamic 
process of dreaming. Arendt‘s placement of the Sputnik‘s orbit in the wider context of 
popular dreams of space travel and extraterrestrialism also addresses the temporal 
development of new science and the emergence of new technologies such as 
nanotechnology, in which ‗dreams‘ become ‗reality‘. For Arendt this dreaming 
provides the discursive and ideological context in which such developments are 
positioned. New technologies are firmly rooted in, and yet challenge and potentially 
transform, ‗the human condition‘. 
 
Recently, the philosopher Jean-Pierre Dupuy (2005) has used Arendt‘s notion of the 
‗human condition‘ in a provocative call for a ‗philosophical foundation of 
nanoethics‘. Following Arendt, he suggests that ‗men dream science before doing it 
and that these dreams … have a causal effect on the world and transform the human 
condition‘ (p. 6). His use of Arendt‘s notion of the human condition – and her socio-
political understanding of science and technology – allow Dupuy to develop a 
powerful case for a non-consequentialist ‗nano-ethics‘. In contrast to existing 
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teleological frameworks in which ethical analysis is framed simply as a response to 
the consequences of specific ‗techniques‘(Luhmann 1992) – Dupuy re-directs 
attention to the transformative potential of new technologies. Dupuy suggests that 
ethical analysis of new and emerging technologies should not only encompass their 
technical specificities but also the wider socio-political framing. That is ethical 
analysis should not simply focus on  restricted analyses of individual scientific 
techniques, but rather on the deontological and normative challenge posed by the 
potential transformations in the human condition.  
 
In this paper I build on and extend Dupuy‘s account by developing what might be 
called a ‗non- consequentialist‘ politics of nanotechnology. That is, I attempt to 
develop a political rationale for the consideration of the normative and deontological 
dimensions of nanotechnologies. Despite the lively characterisations of relationship 
between society and new technologies in contemporary fiction writing, cinema and 
cultural studies, contemporary political debates concerning competing visions of the 
relationship between technology and society are typically limited to arguments about 
very specific technical questions. For example, in recent technological controversies 
concerning GM foods and civil nuclear power, political debate largely centred on 
questions of safety and the veracity of official risk assessment methodologies 
(Jasanoff 2005; Kearnes et al. 2006; Wynne 1982). There is typically very little space 
in such discussion for normative questioning of the way the social, political and 
economic assumptions are built into contemporary technological imperatives. Nor is 
there is there space to consider the potentially transformative dimensions of new 
technologies outside narrow debates around risk, safety and control.  
 
Here I focus particularly on widely articulated notions of nanotechnology as enabling, 
and depending upon, ‗control over structure of matter‘, and the ability to precisely 
manipulate matter at the atomic scale. This vision of atomic manufacture – from the 
bottom up – once associated with radical and speculative possibilities of ‗molecular 
machinery‘, has become a mainstream vision of fabricating nanostructures ‗by 
design‘(Kearnes, Macnaghten & Wilsdon 2006; Roco 1999). Whilst this goal has 
much social, cultural and moral resonance – particularly connotations of the control, 
the creation of life and the technologisation of nature – its rhetorical scope is not 
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matched by the more provisional efforts of contemporary nanoscience. Such control, 
it seems, is more difficult to achieve than might be imagined.  
 
This distinction between the dreams and vision of nanotechnology, and the reality of 
contemporary nanoscience, mirrors an almost perpetual battle to lay claim to the ‗real 
science‘ of emerging technology – the so called ‗truth behind the nanotechnology 
buzz‘ (Berube 2006). Central to Dupuy‘s approach is the contention that 
nanotechnology is embedded within a set of future-oriented socio-cultural dreams and 
scenarios that imagine its possibilities and foretell of its potentially transformative 
effects (see also Brown and Michael 2003). Accordingly, Dupuy suggests that 
‗existing efforts in nanoethics … take extreme care to distinguish what they deem to 
be serious science from what everyone refers to as ―science fiction‖‘ (p. 6).  
 
Similarly, Macphee (2006) suggests that ‗contemporary assessments of technology 
are characterised by a failure to think the impact of technology beyond notions of 
reproduction and intensification, so they tend to envisage the political consequences 
of technology in terms of static repetition, generating dystopian scenarios of 
disempowerment and loss of agency‘ (p. 65). Discussion and analysis of the ‗social 
implications‘ of nanotechnology has tended to mirror this process, with debate 
centring on areas of societal and ethical concern including; the possible toxicological 
effects of new nanomaterials, social, political and ethical debates about the role of 
nanotechnology in enhancing (human) life, improving surveillance systems and 
political control, widening the gap between rich and poor and possible environmental 
effects.
i
 Visions of nanotechnology as enabling control over the structure of matter, 
for example, are represented as evidence for the increasing technologisation of ‗life 
itself‘. As such nanotechnology is simply cast as an intensification of existing 
processes of technologisation.  
 
This is the dilemma for consequentialist accounts in which implications of new 
technologies are seen to emanate only from ‗the science‘. Not only does this create an 
awkward dependence on scientists to articulate the social, political and ethical 
implications of their own work, but more pragmatically Dupuy suggests ‗what 
constitutes [serious science] varies one report to another‘ (p. 6). This attempt to 
uncover the ‗truth behind the hype‘ suggests a broader schism between theoretical 
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accounts of nanotechnology possibilities and their material actualisation in 
contemporary nanoscience. 
 
Dupuy‘s ethical account is, therefore, inextricably future oriented through his 
suggestion that ethical analysis focus on the transformative potential of 
nanotechnologies.
ii
 Similarly, for Arendt, politics is about a certain form of 
temporality and action – about creativity and newness. That is, her politics is based in 
the future – in the transformations possible to the human condition. Her meditation on 
the orbit of the Sputnik speaks not simply of technology as evidence of existing 
political stratifications. Rather, technology both enables and potentially transforms the 
human condition. The complex negotiation between dreams and realities of 
technological futures is an active political space in which such futures are actively 
worked out in the present, determining future social and political arrangements. By 
widening the frame of analysis and assessment of nanotechnology of Dupuy insists 
that questions of justice, fairness and transformations in the human conditions be 
addressed in the present. Similary, in their provocative call for a form of ‗upstream 
politics‘ of nanotechnology Wilsdon and Willis (2004) suggest that in place of 
questions of safety and risk, normative questions such as: 
  
Why this technology? Why not another? Who needs it? Who is controlling it? 
Who benefits from it? Can they be trusted? What will it mean for me and my 
family? Will it improve the environment? What will it mean for people in the 
developing world? (p. 28) 
 
be addressed in the early stages the development of a technology. Rather than simply 
read-off the social implications of nanotechnology Wilsdon and Willis suggest that 
the inbuilt political, economic, and normative framings of nanotechnology be 
addressed in its very development.  
 
In concert with both Dupuy and Wilsdon and Willis I suggest that this spatio-temporal 
disparity between programmatic visions of nanotechnology and their articulation in 
nanoscience is precisely the space for a normative politics of nanotechnology. 
However, in describing a nonconsequentialist politics of nanotechnology I depart 
from Dupuy‘s notion of temporality. Drawing on both Henri Bergson and William 
James – who both share a certain ‗commitment to continuity‘ – I suggest the 
disjuncture between the visions and realities of nanoscience is not simply a temporal 
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disparity between what is possible now and what will be possible in the future. Rather 
this disparity describes a rather more symptomatic temporal contingency in 
technology itself – what Bergson terms ‗the virtual‘ (see also Luhmann 1992). ‗The 
future‘ is, strictly speaking, unknowable and yet by positing a continuum between the 
present and the future – in which the future is a product of individuation and 
differentiation – it is possible to construct a normative critique of nanotechnology. 
The non-consequentialist politics I develop here, therefore attempts to address 
normative dimensions of nanotechnology articulation in the present through a humble 
acknowledgement of our own ignorance in relation to the future (Luhmann 1992) 
 
Nanotechnology Dreams 
Nanotechnology is a field that is in flux. Though often ascribed to Feynman‘s (1960) 
lecture ‗There‘s plenty of room at the bottom‘, the word nanotechnology itself is 
young, being initially coined by Taniguchi in 1974.  Its constitution as a field is 
largely the product of recently initiated government sponsored networks of 
coordinated of research and innovation activities – such as the US National 
Nanotechnology Initiative, or nanotechnology research funding initiatives of the 
European Commission. Nanotechnology also displays the classic symptoms of a 
technological field in its early development in which there is a clear mismatch 
between the (often) hyperbolic promises made about its potentially liberating and 
transformative possibilities and the seemingly more mundane and provisional 
advances made in laboratory settings (Rip 2006).  The key, therefore, to opening up a 
political account of nanotechnology is this relationship between the dreams of 
nanotechnology and their manifestation and permutation in contemporary research 
and development.  
 
Whereas Arendt‘s account is vaguely populist – suggesting that science simply gives 
extended expression to a form of vernacular dreaming – Marcus (1995) describes the 
dream-quality of new technology in much more politicised terms as technoscientific 
imaginaries. Marcus suggests that tacitly held and deeply social assumptions shape 
the development of new science and technology. New technologies – such as 
nanotechnology – are imagined as solving current problems, creating wealth and 
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prosperity, and bettering the human condition. This tacit dreaming is particularly 
evident in the strategic roadmapping and foresighting initiatives that attempt to 
anticipate and shape the development of nanotechnology. A number of such 
‗roadmaps‘ have recently been published, including a Technology Roadmap for 
Productive Nanosystems, a Chemical Industry R&D Roadmap for Nanomaterials by 
Design, a Technology Roadmap for Nanoelectronics, and even a roadmap for 
Nanotechnology in the Forest Product Industry (European Commission 2004; 
Foresight Institute 2005; Forest Product Laboratory 2005; Vision 2020 Technology 
Partnership 2003). These roadmaps – which are typically sponsored and strategically 
published by Governments and industry associations – offer scenarios that will be 
enabled by nanotechnology and as goals to be achieved. They attempt to give 
coherence to the development of nanotechnologies and to lever discursive attention 
for a range of specific ends – for example to emphasise the importance of 
nanoelectronics over and above other applications of nanoscience and technology. 
Such imaginaries are ways of ‗marshalling‘ the future through the deployment of 
hope, expectation and anticipation (Anderson this volume; Brown and Michael 2003; 
Van Lente 1993). They also serve to shape the field, advocating for greater research 




Similarly, public discourse and commentary concerning nanotechnology is dominated 
by speculative lists of existing and possible future applications of nanotechnology. 
For example, Forbes magazine publishes an annual list of ‗top nano products‘. The 
2005 list included nanotechnology-based footwarmers, a washable bed mattress which 
uses nanoparticles to create an ‗semi-impervious layer that traps fluids and particles 
so they can be washed away‘, and the 3M dental adhesive that utilises a ‗silica 
nanofiller technology that forms a stronger bond to tooth enamel‘ (www.forbes.com). 
Alternatively Roco and Bainbridge‘s (2002) National Science Foundation report 
Converging Technologies for Improved Performance provides an almost limitless list 
of possibilities enabled by advances at the nanoscale. This list of potential 
applications includes: more durable human bodies, efficient weapons systems and 
ubiquitous real-time information systems. 
 
In addition to predicted applications of nanotechnology other tacit visions signal the 
socio-political expectations of the value of nanotechnology. For example, Doubleday 
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(this volume) suggests nanotechnology represents an ‗intensification of concern in 
science policy with the application of knowledge for economic growth‘. The potential 
economic impact of nano-related products is typically cast as ‗revolutionary‘. For 
example, US nano-policy documents speak of nanotechnology as ‗leading to the next 
industrial revolution‘ (NSTC 2000a) and current estimates of the potential value of 
future nanotechnology industries range anywhere from the billions to the trillions 
(Department of Trade and Industry 2002). Doubleday continues by suggesting that 
built into this expectation is the further expectation that strategic funding and 
infrastructure support will maximise the profitability of UK nanotechnology 
innovations. He suggests that this is manifested in an ‗imperative to produce useful 
knowledge [which] has shaped the practice of academic nanoscience over the last 
decade‘. 
  
Similarly Kearnes, Macnaghten and Wilsdon (2006) outline a series of ‗programmatic 
imaginaries‘ of nanotechnology that operate as meta-level discourses and as key 
drivers in the development of nanotechnology. For example, nanotechnology is 
described as an extension of the ‗miniaturisation imperative‘ and as perpetuating the 
inexorable drive toward miniaturisation of electronic circuits and data storage. Also 
nanotechnology is represented as a new kind of science which is both interdisciplinary 
and ‗socially robust‘. Both Bennett and Sarewitz (2006) and Rip (2006) describe the 
way in which this discourse of social robustness is intimately tied to the expectation 
that nanotechnology represents an opportunity to ‗learn from the mistakes‘ of past 
technology controversies by building social intelligence and research into the 
development of the technology itself (see also Macnaghten et al. 2005). 
 
Discourses of Control 
Such discourses are enabled by, and dependent upon, the foundational conviction that 
nanotechnology represents a new scientific paradigm based on the ability to precisely 
control and manipulate matter at the atomic and molecular scales. The vision of 
nanotechnology as both enabling and depending upon the precise control over the 
structure of matter is best exemplified by the former HP researcher Jamie Dinkelacker 
(2002), who claimed that: ‗Total (or near total) control over the structure of matter 
will intrinsically revolutionise our lives. No Aspect of our daily living – let alone 
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other technologies – will remain untouched‘ (p. 2). This phrase – ‗control over the 
structure of matter‘ – is a symbol of the sheer promise and transformative possibility 
of nanotechnology. Despite its obviously hyperbolic tone, the imperative to gain such 
control has become a paradigmatic goal for much nanotechnology research. This goal 
has become the default objective for current research through which to realise the 
wider transformative possibilities of nanotechnology (Kearnes et al. 2006; Kearnes, 
Macnaghten & Wilsdon 2006). Roco (1999) signals this basic programmatic goal for 
nanoscale research, by defining nanotechnology as: 
 
Concerned with development and utilization of structures and devices with 
organizational features at the intermediate scale between individual molecules 
and about 100 nm where novel properties occur as compared to bulk materials. 
It implies the capability to build up tailored nanostructures and devices for 
given functions by control at the atomic and molecular levels. (pp. 1-2) 
 
For Roco, nanotechnology is defined as a capability to create tailored structures at the 
nanoscale, based on precise control and manipulation of matter at this scale. The key 
for Roco is the injection of human-derived ‗function‘ at the nanoscale through the 
production of tailored nanostructures and materials.  Though advances in nanoscience 
have been successful in producing novel materials and fabrication processes, this 
degree of atomic control remains elusive. As such the quest to achieve control at the 
nanoscale represents, for Roco, the underlying and unifying project of contemporary 
nanoscience research. Roco suggests that once such control is achieved it be possible 
to create tailored nanostructures with desired shapes, patterns and architectures.  
 
Visions of control over the structure of matter are both theoretical and pragmatic, 
suggesting that such control is logically possible and constitutes the ‗next step‘ in 
developing functional nanotechnologies and materials. The theoretical vision of the 
possibilities for precise control of the atomic scale is motivated by what might be 
termed a biological turn in physics and a materialist turn in biology. Primary in this 
context is Erwin Schrödinger‘s (1944) essay What is Life? The Physical Aspect of the 
Living Cell which implies a physicalist understanding of life by suggesting that 
biological processes may be explained physically. In this work – which prefigures 
later developments in systems theory – Schrödinger explains the origin of life in 
physical terms, through recourse to theoretical physics.  Indeed, the opening lines of 
Schrödinger‘s ‗little book‘ – a quote from Spinoza‘s Ethics – ‗Homo liber nulla de re 
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minus quam de morte cogitat; et ejus sapientia non mortis sed vitae meditatio est
iv‘ 
signal the intention to deploy the physical discipline of physics to explain life itself, 
and particularly the emergence of self-ordering systems.  Accordingly he asks: ‗How 
can events in space and time which take place within the spatial boundary of a living 
organism be accounted for by physics and chemistry?‘ (p. 3). Schrödinger answers 
this question by suggesting that life is implicitly atomistic. He argues that biological 
processes are controlled and determined by characteristics of their atomic 
constituents. For example, he suggests that: 
 
The unfolding of events in the life cycle of an organism exhibits an admirable 
regularity and orderliness, unrivalled by anything we meet with in inanimate 
matter. We find it controlled by a supremely well-ordered group of atoms, 




For Schrödinger living cells are physical. All things – and therefore biological process 
and life itself – are absolutely divisible into atoms and molecules.  Schrödinger‘s 
vision of life also signals the importance of the notion of control. He suggested that, 
though complex, the emergence of ordered, biological life is controlled by atomic 
constituents of such processes. Through this vision of absolute divisibility it becomes 
possible to technologically manipulate life itself through the precise design control of 
this atomic base (Mody 2006). Schrödinger‘s suggestion that biological life is 
accomplished through the selective control over the movement of atoms and 
molecules demonstrates the possibility of similar human designed processes.  
 
The second theoretical reference informing discourses of the precise control over the 
structure of matter is what might be termed a ‗biological turn‘ in theoretical physics 
and mathematics, particularly in the work of von Neumann. Von Neumann‘s theory of 
automata – a mathematical model of self-reproducing systems – represents a form of 
computational determinism. His theory suggest the possibility that naturally occurring 
self-reproducing systems might be recreated through appropriate algorithms (von 
Neumann 1961). The goal, for von Neumann, is to ‗apply the philosophy underlying 
natural automata to artificial automata‘ (1966, 71). As such he prefigures the machinic 
imitation of ‗natural automata‘ by suggesting that it is possible to create a machine 
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which recreates itself modelled on biological examples. Thus he compares Turing‘s 
early work in computing: 
 
which is a box with a finite number of states. Its outputs are modifications of 
another entity …The medium which is fed to the automaton and which is 
produced by the automaton is completely different from the automaton. In fact 
the automaton doesn‘t produce any medium at all; it merely modifies a 
medium which is completely different from it. (p. 74)  
 
to a machine which is able to create copies of itself: 
 
There is no question of producing matter out of nothing. Rather one imagines 
automata which can modify objects similar to themselves, or effect syntheses 
by picking up parts and putting them together (p. 75, see also Cooper 1983) 
 
For von Neumann, life is controlled by code and is essentially computable. The goal, 
for von Neumann, is therefore the creation of sufficiently complex computations that 
would model such existing natural systems.  
 
Von Neumann and Schrödinger provide both the vision and theoretical resources for 
the precise manipulation and control of matter in contemporary nanoscience. For 
both, ‗life‘ is the benchmark against which to compare ‗human-designed‘ machines. 
Indeed both marvel at the complexity of biological systems and the ability of living 
machines to self-organise and self-reproduce. The key object is to recreate the 
functionality of living systems and the means and possibility of its technological 
recreation (Lehn 2002). 
 
This theoretical account of the sheer possibility of designing functional nanosystems 
also provides the foundation for a more pragmatic vision in which accomplishing such 
control represents the logical ‗next stage‘ in the development of nanotechnology. For 
example, Roco (1999) suggests that: 
 
The promise of nanotechnology is being realised through the confluence of 
advances in scientific discovery that has enabled the atomic and molecular 
control of material building blocks, and engineering that has provided the 
means to assemble and utilise these tailored building blocks for new purposes 
and devices. … Assembling of atoms, molecules and collections of assemblies 
of molecules into nanostructures with a defined function by design, under 
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controlled conditions, is a critical component of nanoscale science and 
technology. (p. 5) 
 
For Roco, current applications of nanoscience represent only the first stage of a 
broader technological program. The ‗next stage‘ is the creation of nanostructures 
defined not simply by their novel properties but by their ‗function‘ as objects of 
human-derived design. Control over the structure of matter is therefore represented as 
both a theoretical possibility, and pragmatically as the ‗next stage‘, that must be 
achieved in order to accomplish the wider promise of nanotechnology.  
Design and Evolution 
The key terms of this vision are, therefore, design, precision and control. This 
discourse mirrors that of the ‗fantastic voyage‘v by suggesting that the, as yet, 
unexploited space of the atomic might be subject to human intentionality and 
engineering (Schwarz 2004). The intersection of visions of control, precision and 
function with broader expectations of value, and the exploitation of the nanoscale, 
signal the politics at stake in the development of nanotechnology  (Waldby 2002). 
Nanotechnology represents an intensification of technological control over the atomic 
bases of life itself. Such visions of ‗life‘, ‗matter‘ and ‗evolution‘ connect with 
enduring discussions of the implications of new and advanced technologies. Both 
Fukuyama (2002) and McKibben (2003) present a dystopian account of the 
technological transformation of biological life through biotechnologies. For both, 
such technologies represent further evidence of Heidegger‘s notion that modern 
technology is defined as a project of alienation from, and technological mastery, over 
nature (Heidegger 2003). Alternatively, for Rose (2001), the penetration of design and 
control into the atomic and material bases of life contributes to ‗politics of life itself‘. 
Rabinow and Rose (2003) situate contemporary biotechnologies as an intensification 
of political control over life itself and symptomatic of the broader Foucauldian thesis 
that ‗Power … is now situated and exercised at the level of life.‘ (p. 1).vi Conceivably, 
nanotechnology represents a further incarnation of this politicisation of life, with an 
even finer grained control over the atomic bases of life. The intensification of this 
politics of life is further strengthened by the fact that discourses of control over the 
structure of matter are themselves the product of wider socio-political expectations of 
the value and transformative potential of such interventions. The transformation of 
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matter at the nanoscale is therefore emblematic of this generic transformation in the 
operation of political power, such that molecular life is subject to control and 
manipulation.  
 
Both accounts of the socio-political implications of the technologisation of ‗life itself‘ 
treat such technologies simply as evidence of a wider politicisation of life. 
Technology figures as either producing the dystopic ‗end of nature‘ – for Fukuyama 
(2002) and McKibben (2003) – or as an advanced iteration in the development of 
disciplinary power. Casting nanotechnology as simply an intensification of the 
technologisation of life is dependent on a particular notion of the temporality of 
technologies, in which specific nanotechnologies are situated as discrete, temporally 
specific achievements. Such accounts are dependent on accepting that visions of the 
control over the material world will be developed in the future. Both accounts fail to 
conceptualise what Ardent characterises as the active and transformative capacity of 
technology. The political significance is not simply that matter is – or will be – 
transformed by nanotechnology. Rather the politics of nanotechnology are constituted 
through the negotiation of visions and dreams of control and more provisional results 
of nanoscience research.  
 
Both accounts, also ignore the material contingency inherent in the development 
nanotechnology and visions of control over the structure of matter. For example, 
visions of control operate in (at least) two ways (Bensaude-Vincent 2006). First, early 
speculative and futuristic accounts of nanotechnology entailed visions of the direct 
physical manipulation of matter. According to these accounts future nanotechnology 
would be characterised by nanoscale machines, factories and replicators that would 
create objects ‗atom by atom‘ through the direct and precise positioning of atomic 
particles (Drexler 1986). The theoretical possibility suggested by both Von Neumann 
and Schrödinger is suggestive of a second and more active version of nanoscale 
control, in which processes of evolution and systems change are utilised and 
mimicked in the fabrication of structures and devices. Rather than directly manipulate 
matter atom by atom, existing chemical and biological processes are used a template 
for designing functional nanosystems (Jones 2004; Seeman and Belcher 2002).   
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The difference between both notions of control is the degree of intentionality with 
which matter is to be transformed. The direct manipulation of matter, atom by atom, 
indicates the possibility of creating fully intentional tailor-made and human-designed 
nanostructures. Technical discussions and debates of this vision have concerned the 
sheer technical feasibility of the precise manipulation of matter in this way, and have 
been characterised by attempts to lay claim to the scientific reality of nanotechnology 
and what is ‗actually possible‘ at the nanoscale.vii The second account, in which ‗life‘ 
is used as a template for nanotechnology, presents a more complicated and distributed 
vision of intentionality.  Rather than directly manipulate matter, nano devices and 
structures would be ‗created‘ – or grown – by using existing self-replicating systems 
or chemical synthesis as templates or by modelling the functionality of biological 
systems such as protein or DNA (Conrad 1992; Huie 2003; Lehn 2002; Rasmussen et 
al. 2004; Whitesides and Grzybowski 2002). Such creations are, therefore, not fully 
intentional. Rather, they are the product of a form of intentional evolution. 
 
The suggestion that nanotechnology simply represents an intensification of 
contemporary biopower therefore ignores the fact that experimental systems rarely 
dominate their subject. Despite articulations of total control the material world the 
material specificity of the nanoscale necessitates forms of control over that are both 
contingent and provisional (Kearnes 2006).
viii
 A political engagement with visions of 
control over the structure of matter must, therefore, attend to this inbuilt temporality. 
Particularly useful in this context is the pragmatist notion of ‗radical empiricism‘ in 
which felt experience is expressed not as a succession of atomic instants, but rather as 
a continuum. William James (1909) outlines radical empiricism as a phenomenology 
of: 
 
a through-and-through union of adjacent minima of experience, of the 
confluence of every passing moment of concretely felt experience with its 
immediately next neighbours.  (p. 326) 
 
If life is cast, in this way, as immersed in a continuum of felt experience – which 
evades objective description – specific materialisations of life therefore represent 
temporal modifications rather than discrete entities. Bergson (1911 [1988]) expresses 
the creation of specific materialities in the context of this continuum as movement of 
the virtual and the actual. He suggests that Bergson:  
 15 
 
I enter neither into one nor into the other nor into both at once, although both, 
united, may give a fair imitation of the mutual interpenetration and continuity 
that I find at the base of my own self. … Matter divides actually what was but 
potentially manifold; and, in this sense, individuation is part of the work of 
matter, in part the result if life‘s own inclination. (p. 258) 
 
The implication of both Bergson and James‘ ‗commitment to continuity‘ix is that 
technological objects are themselves immersed in a temporally specific continuum. 
This is particularly apparent, for example, in the histories of technology developed by 
Leroi-Gourhan (1943; 1945), Simondon (1964; 1992) and Stiegler (1994) in which 
particular technologies are regarded in evolutionary terms as material individuations, 
ruptures or breaks in an overall continuum of human – and non-human – 
experimentation. For Bergson, new technologies are a result of a form of 
differentiation rather than heroic creation. He replaces a notion of ―realisation‖ with a 
conception of ―actualisation‖ suggesting that technical objects are provisional 
achievements that might also be subject to further change and evolution (see also 
Deleuze 1986; 1989; 1991). Dupuy suggest that visions of nanotechnology as 
enabling the precise control over the structure of matter are justifiable read as ethical 
and normative claims upon future human social arrangements. In extending Dupuy 
account, I suggest that a normative politics of nanotechnology necessitates a rendering 
of the material and temporal ruptures that make such forms of control possible, and 
yet render them as inextricably provisional and contingent.  
Nanotechnology as a site of ‘enchantment’ 
In late 2004 I spent some time at the Cambridge Nanoscience Centre – talking to and 
observing nanoscientists – trying to unpack the societal, political and ethical 
dimensions of nanoscience and nanotechnology. The nanoscience centre – and others 
like it in London, Bristol, Manchester and Newcastle – is an attempt by the university 
to coordinate and centralise nanoscale research in one building with shared access to 
research equipment, instruments and clean rooms. It is in this building that images of 
futuristic nanoscience are perhaps best realised, with its collection of state-of-the-art 
clean rooms, open-plan office, research, and informal meeting spaces. The 
nanoscience centre is the also the lead partner in a larger network of nanoscience 
research – an Interdisciplinary Research Collaboration (IRC) between the University 
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of Cambridge, University College London and the University of Bristol, jointly 
funded by four UK research councils – the EPSRC, BBSRC, MRC and the MoD. As 
one of the premier UK nanoscience research consortiums the IRC ‗is directed at the 
very core of nanotechnology and as such will aim to provide an underpinning 
interdisciplinary activity with the general theme of fabrication and organisation of 
molecular structures‘ (Cambridge University 2001, 2). 
 
Whilst at the Nanoscience Centre I met a young researcher – John.x He explained that 
the aim of his research was investigating techniques for the synthesis of three-
dimensional nano-structures and nano wires. As such the goal of his research was to 
develop ways of catalysing the growth of such nanostructures so that by controlling 
the growth conditions he might be able to produce a reproducible method for 
synthesising three-dimensional nano-structures with desired shapes, patterns and 
morphologies.  
 
John explained the goals of his research: 
 
If we can understand how structures are grown then maybe we can tailor the 
way we grow structures and actually grow a structure which we‘re looking for 
… The whole point is that we want to be able to control the structure, the 
morphology, and the size of these structures. Then [they can] self assemble 
into an array and then from there it has some technological relevance because 
you know you‘ve got control and you can reproduce the stuff which is the 
main problem. (Interview with Researcher, Cambridge NanoScience Centre, 
2004) 
 
John‘s research is therefore concerned with the nature of certain materialities –
specifically nanoscale silicon carbide. At a fundamental level John was interested in 
the material properties of nanoscale silicon so as to produce more reliable ways of 
growing desirable shapes and wires. In this way the ambition of John‘s research 
contributes to the meta-level goal of gaining control over the structure of matter. The 
key goal for John was to create reproducible methods for the fabrication of 
nanostructures with and desired shapes and patterns. His research aimed not only to 
investigate the nanoscale properties of silicon carbide, but rather to create specific and 
tailored nanoscale arrangements of silicon carbide.  
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However, John also explained that he primarily worked by using the existing 
literature on the material properties of silicon and silicon dioxide to build computer 
simulations of its growth and by testing these models experimentally. In his research 
practice, John negotiated a complex relation between theoretical simulations of the 
‗behaviour‘ of nanoscale iron and the behaviour exhibited in his experiments. 
 
I‘m trying to develop a catalyst technique which is reproducible. So that every 
time I grow some nano structures I‘m using the same catalysts, or I know 
what‘s happening at that fundamental level. … And so I‘m trying to reproduce 
a way of making iron nano particles to catalyse these structures and I‘m 
having trouble doing that. And you know I‘ve been talking to the author of the 
paper and I don‘t know. Something‘s amiss somewhere but I haven‘t found it. 
It‘s rather frustrating. (Interview with Researcher, Cambridge NanoScience 
Centre, 2004) 
 
For John, this frustration is caused by the disjuncture between his experimental results 
and what he had expected based on computational models and theoretical accounts. 
Although this ambiguity, caused by the difference between theoretical accounts and 
experimental results, is a generic feature of scientific practice, John‘s frustration 
speaks of a wider disparity. There is a disjuncture between the dreams of 
nanotechnology and the results of scientific practice (Rheinberger 1997; Stengers 
1997). Though John‘s research is situated within a wider attempt to investigate 
possible fabrication techniques, the reproducibility and reliability of such techniques 
has proved elusive. This mismatch between the theoretical possibility of the precise 
manipulation of matter and more provisional results of contemporary nanoscience is a 
common feature of the field. For example, another researcher at Cambridge described 
how a priori assumptions of control and accuracy are moderated by actual research 
practice: 
 
Most of it is looking at what biology has done and saying right, I‘ll have that. 
So you take it out of the biological context.  And sometimes they just do 
something that you don‘t expect at all.  We don‘t have the mechanisms to 
predict. We can‘t say right I‘ll take this and it will do this.  We‘re just not 
advanced enough in our biology. It‘s a horribly complex system. It is possible 
to achieve control, but only by trial and error. (Interview with Researcher, 
Cambridge NanoScience Centre, 2004) 
 
There are many ways of interpreting this disparity. It is tempting to suggest that the 
disparity between discourses of control and prediction and the provisional results of 
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nanoscience is a measure of the gap separating nanotechnology ‗dreams‘ from 
nanotechnology ‗reality‘. The notion that discourses of control and nanoscale 
functionality are simply fiction compared with actual nanoscience is an attractive 
proposition. However, for proponents of nanotechnology the difference between 
theory and practice is simply evidence of a temporal distinction between scientific 
research and technological development. They suggest that such difficulties will be 
overcome in time. Thus, for example, proponents of the creation of functional nano-
devices and molecular machines typically employ long time horizons in predicting the 
emergence of such developments.
xi
 Of course definitions of what ‗counts‘ as 
(legitimate) nanoscale research is the subject of much conjecture. Opponents of the 
radical visions of nanoscale machines suggest that this disparity evidences a broader 
impossibility of creating functional nanoscale devices, and the necessity to gain broad 
consensus on other goals for nanoscience research.  
 
Rheinberger (1997) captures something of the ambivalence of research practice and 
the mismatch between theory and results. He terms the products of the experiment 
‗epistemic things‘, capturing the dual quality of objects that are simultaneously 
conceptual and materially situated. In defining epistemic things he suggest that the 
results of experimental systems are: ‗shaped in and occupy an opaque intermediary 
space: they lie, so to speak, at the interface between the material and the conceptual 
side of science‘ (Rheinberger 2003, 624). For Rheinberger, the indeterminacy of such 
objects suggests that they are objects of conjecture and argument in the development 
of scientific knowledge and the refinement of experimental systems. That is they are 
political objects. The disparity between visions of the control over the structure of 
matter and experimental results serves a metaphor for nanotechnology in general. 
Nanotechnology is a field in flux, characterised by competing claims to its ‗reality‘. 
The movement between discursive accounts of nanotechnology and the ambivalent 
materialities is a movement through which different ‗realities‘ of nanotechnology are 
produced, or ‗enacted‘. As explored above, nanotechnology is the subject of an array 
of promises and expectation, which are ambiguously interpreted and negotiated by 
nanoscience researchers. Though such discourses play an important role in structuring 
the meta-level goals of nanotechnology research, the relationship between 
programmatic visions and the everyday practice of nanoscience is complicated. In this 
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negotiation gaps and tensions emerge between structural visions of the economic and 
social promise of nanoscience and researchers‘ own experiences.  
 
For example, in response to predictions of a nanotechnology revolution, many of the 
scientists interviewed were more cautious and pragmatic. One researcher at 
Cambridge questioned the expectations that his science should be used as an engine 
for innovation: 
 
I‘ve no interest myself in applying the science which comes out. I‘m interested 
to see what happens but I‘m not interested in being entrepreneurial with the 
material... The goal as I see it is to do research and to get the results into the 
literature and see what other people do with it. … I mean Gordon Brown and 
others are perhaps trying to redefine my job to be something different and I‘ve 
a lot of sympathy with that but I‘m not convinced I‘m necessarily the right 
person to be doing that. (Interview with Researcher, Cambridge NanoScience 
Centre, 2004) 
 
The mismatch between visions of control and the results of contemporary nanoscience 
also, therefore, mirror a wider negotiation of social, political and economic discourses 
that structure nanoscience and technology.  
Conclusion – Towards a Nano-politics 
There are many ways of interpreting this disparity between programmatic visions and 
experimental practice. For proponents of nanotechnology this disparity evidences 
simply a temporal negotiation of such discourses. They suggest that control over the 
structure of matter will be achieved ‗in the future‘ and that predicted social and 
economic impacts will therefore ensue. Dupuy interprets this future-orientation 
temporally as a moment for ethical analysis and assessment and also therefore for the 
political negotiation of the normative dimensions of such claims upon the future. 
Alternatively Nordmann (2006) suggests that such claims on the future are more 
precisely related to the politics of the present – in attempts to lay claim to the 
nanoscale and to create rhetorical leverage in the negotiation over the ‗reality‘ of 
nanotechnology.  For Nordmann, nanotechnology is spatial and is defined by an 
attempt to inhabit the space of the nanoscale (Nordmann 2004).  
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Dupuy and Nordmann therefore position political engagement with nanotechnology 
differently as either a temporal project of debating claims upon (future) human 
conditions and social arrangements or as a negotiation of the present conditions 
through which nanoscience is organised as particular set of claims upon the 
nanoscale. Alternatively I suggest that a normative politics of nanotechnology might 
rethink the very possibility of ‗laying claim‘ to either the temporal or the spatial. The 
disparity between the ‗dreams‘ and ‗reality‘ of nanotechnology is not simply a 
distinction between science fiction and science fact, nor a question of dreams that will 
be realised at some future date. Rather, by adopting a radical empiricist notion of 
spatio-temporality – Bergson‘s notion of duration – it is possible to highlight the 
impossibility of objectively ‗laying claim‘ to either the temporality of the future or the 
spatiality of the nanoscale. In the same way that Bergson suggests that technological 
devices are not simply discrete achievements, but rather moments of individuation, 
the future exists as a form of differentiation.  
 
A non-consequentalist politics of nanotechnology might therefore be cast as a way of 
relating to an unknowable future – an acknowledgement of what Luhmann (1992) 
terms an ‗ecology of ignorance‘. He suggests:  
 
Today we can speak of the future practically only in terms of the probable or 
improbable, that is, in terms of a fictively secured reality. We now know that 
future presents will bring other things than the present future can express, and 
when we speak of the future we express this discrepancy by dealing only with 
probabilities and improbabilities (p. 95) 
 
Given that it is only possible to speak of the future in terms of probabilities a non-
consequentalist politics of nanotechnology might therefore adopt a relational spatio-
temporality as an alternative stance to that of ‗laying‘ claim to either the future or the 
nanoscale.  
 
Whereas the possibility of creating functional nanosystems and tailored 
nanostrcutures is informed by notions of control and precision, this articulation is 
complicated by their ambivalent reception by nanoscientists. In the context of the 
elision between competing visions of nanotechnology, political power operates in an 
attempt to create coherence and consensus in an otherwise unruly field. 
Roadmapping, foresighting and standardisation activities utilise public policy to shape 
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the development of nanotechnology toward prescribed ends. However these attempts 
to claim the future are complicated by the sheer unknowability of the future  
 
Nanotechnology does not simply represent a further intensification of the modernist 
drive toward the technologisation of life and alienation from nature.  Though dreams 
of atomic control and precision are a permutation of this narrative, nanotechnology is 
best described as a set of contingent technological futures. The social and political 
implications of nanotechnology are not simply mitigated against. Rather in Arendt‘s 
terms the politics of nanotechnology is an active politics of creating the future.  She 
suggests that ‗the polis, properly speaking, is not the city-state in its physical location; 
it is the organisation of the people as it arises out of acting and speaking together‘ 
(Arendt 1958 198). In the same way that Jasanoff (2003) calls for ‗technologies of 
humility‘ and a re-examination of human pretensions of control over technological 
systems we might imagine a mode of agonistic political relation – of acting and 
speaking together – that adopts a similar humility in relation to the spatio-temporality 
of its inventions. That is, by attending to normative dimensions of nanotechnology 
articulation in the present we might humbly approach the contingency of our 
responses to the future.  
 
Notes  
                                                 
i
 Recent attempts to characterise the breadth of social concern associated with nanotechnology have 
sought to distinguish between broader socio-political implications and narrower question of 
environmental and human risk associated with new nanotechnologies. Accordingly Renn and Roco 
(2006) distinguish two frameworks of ‗risk debate‘ in which narrow questions of environmental 
toxicology would be tackled through existing risk assessment methodologies and wider social-political 
concerns through political debate and consensus.  
ii
 My thanks to Alfred Nordmann for conversations on this point.  
iii
 There has been such a proliferation of such roadmapping and foresighting activities that a critique of 
the possibility of ‗roadmapping congestion‘ and lack of clarity has emerged (Smith forthcoming). 
iv
 ‗There is nothing over which a free man ponders less than death; his wisdom is, to meditate not on 
death but on life‘ (Spinoza Ethics, 1677 Pt IV, Prop. 67) 
v
 The 1960s science fiction film in which a miniaturised submarine in injected into the scientist Jan 
Benes. 
vi
 See also Foucault (1990). 
vii
 See for example the well publicised debated between Eric Drexler and Richard Smalley: (Smalley 
2001; 2003a; 2003b; Drexler 2003a; 2003b) 
viii
 In this context recent geographical scholarship on matter and materiality has emphasized the 
significance of what Kearnes (2003) terms ‗the expressive waywardness of matter‘ (p. 149 see also 
Anderson & Tolia-Kelly 2004) as an expression of material agency that escape forms of technical 
determination.  
ix
 See Ansell-Pearson (2002) for an analysis of both James and Bergson on the notion of continuity.  
x
 All names have been anonymised.  
xi
 For example, Renn and Roco (2006) suggest that the development of nanotechnology can be broken 
into four stages or generations: 
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1st generation: Passive nanostructures from 2000  
2nd generation: Active nanostructures from 2005 
3rd generation: Integrated nanosystems from 2010 
4th generation: Heterogeneous molecular nanosystems from 2015/2020. 
Whilst 1st generation products are currently commercially it is claimed that 4
th
 generation 
nanotechnology – truly functional devices – will be developed at some point in the future. (Foresight 




I am grateful to Ben Anderson, Robert Doubleday, Jean-Pierre Dupuy and Alfred 
Nordmann for productive conversations and comments on earlier drafts of this paper. 
I also thank two anonymous referees and participants in the Geographies of 
Nanotechnoscience workshop, Durham University, where this paper was first 
presented. All errors, of course, remain mine.  
 
References 
Anderson B this issue Hope in/for nanotechnology: anticipatory knowledge and the 
governance of affect Area this issue 
Anderson B and Tolia-Kelly D 2004 Matter(s) in social and cultural geography 
Geoforum 35, 669-674. 
Ansell-Pearson K 2002 Philosophy and the Adventure of the Virtual: Bergson and 
the Time of Life Routledge, London and New York.  
Arendt H 1958 The Human Condition University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
Bennett I and Sarewitz D 2006Too little, too late? Research policies on the societal 
implications of nanotechnology in the United States Science as Culture 15(4), 
309-325. 
Bennett J 2001 The Enchantment of Modern Life: Attachments, Crossings, and 
Ethics Princeton University Press, Princeton 
Bennett J 2004 The force of things: steps towards an ecology of matter Political 
Theory 32 347-72 
Bensaude-Vincent B 2006 Two cultures of nanotechnology? in Schummer J and 
Baird D eds Nanotechnology Challenges: Implications for Philosophy, Ethics 
and Society World Scientific Publishing, Singapore 7-28. 
Bergson H 1911 [1988] Creative Evolution Dover Publications, New York. 
Berube D 2006 Nano-Hype: The Truth Behind the Nanotechnology Buzz Prometheus 
Books, London 
Brown N and Michael M 2003 A sociology of expectations: retrospecting prospects 
and prospecting retrospects Technology Analysis and Strategic Management 
15 4-18 
Buck-Morss S 1989 The Dialectics of Seeing: Walter Benjamin and the Arcades 
Project MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. 
Cambridge University 2001 IRC in Nanotechnology University of Cambridge, 
University College London and University of Bristol,  
Conrad M 1992 Emergent computation through self-assembly Nanobiology 2 5-30 
Cooper N G 1983 From Turing and von Neumann to the present Los Alamos Science 
9 22-7 
Deleuze G 1986 Cinema 1: The Movement-Image Athlone Press, London. 
Deleuze G 1999 Cinema 2: The Time-Image Athlone Press, London 
Deleuze G 1991 Bergsonism Zone Books, New York 
 23 
                                                                                                                                            
Department of Trade and Industry 2002 New Dimensions for Manufacturing: A 
UK Strategy for Nanotechnology Department of Trade and Industry, London. 
Dinkelacker J 2002 Transition to Tomorrow: Social Institutions at the Threshold of 
Nanotechnology‘s Molecular Epoch 
(http://sunarcher.org/jamie/pubs/Transition_To_Tomorrow_2002.pdf) 
Doubleday R forthcoming Organising accountability: co-production of 
technoscientific and social worlds in a nanoscience laboratory Area 
forthcoming 
Drexler E K 2003a Drexler Counters Chemical & Engineering News 81 40-1 
Drexler E K 2003b Open letter to Richard Smalley Chemical & Engineering News 
81 38-9 
Drexler K E 1986 Engines of Creation: The Coming Era of Nanotechnology Anchor 
Books, New York 
Dupuy J P 2005 The philosophical foundations of nanoethics: Arguments for a 
method  NanoEthics Conference 
http://ejure.nl/mode=download/downloads/language=nl/id=179/NanoEthics_S
C1.pdf, University of South Carolina, Columbia 
European Commission 2004 Vision 2020: Nanoelectronics at the Centre of Change: 
A Far Sighted Strategy for Europe European Commission, Brussels 
Feynman R 1960 There‘s plenty of room at the bottom: an invitation to enter a new 
field of physics Engineering and Science 23 22-36 
Foresight Institute 2005 Technology Roadmap for Productive Nanosystems 
Foresight Institute, Palo Alto, CA 
Forest Product Laboratory 2005 Nanotechnology for the Forest Products 
Industry—Vision and Technology Roadmap Forest Product Laboratory, 
Madison 
Foucault M 1990 The History of Sexuality –Vol. 1: The Will to Knowledge Penguin, 
London 
Fukuyama F 2002 Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology 
Revolution Profile, London 
Heidegger M 2003 The question concerning technology in Scharff R C and Dusek 
V eds Philosophy of Technology: The Technological Condition, An Anthology 
Blackwell, Oxford 252-64 
Huie J C 2003 Guided molecular self-assembly: a review of recent efforts Smart 
Materials and Structures 12 264-71 
Jassanoff S 2003 Technologies of humility: citizen participation in governing science 
 Minerva 41(3), 223-244 
Jasanoff S 2005 Designs on Nature: Science and Democracy in Europe and the 
United States Princeton University Press, Princeton. 
James W 1909 A Pluristic Universe Longmans, Green and Co., London.  
Jones R A L 2004 Soft Machines: Nanotechnology and Life Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 
Kearnes M B 2006 Chaos and control: nanotechnology and the politics of emergence 
Paragraph 29(2), 57-80. 
Kearnes M B 2003 Geographies that matter—the rhetorical deployment of 
physicality? Social & Cultural Geography 4(2) 139-152. 
Kearnes M B, Grove-White R, P M, Wilsdon J and B W 2006 From bio to nano: 
learning lessons from the agriculture biotechnology controversy in the UK 
Science as Culture 15(4), 291-307. 
 24 
                                                                                                                                            
Kearnes M B, Macnaghten M and Wilsdon J 2006 Governing at the Nanoscale: 
People, Policies and Emerging Technologies Demos, London 
Lehn J M 2002 Toward complex matter: supramolecular chemistry and self-
organisation Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 99 4763-8 
Leroi-Gourhan A 1943 L'Homme et la Matière Albin Michel, Paris 
Leroi-Gourhan A 1945 Milieu et Techniques Albin Michel, Paris 
Luhmann N 1992 Observations of Modernity Stanford University Press, Stanford 
Macnaghten P, Kearnes M B and Wynne B 2005 Nanotechnology, governance and 
public deliberation: what role for the social sciences? Science Communication 
27 268-87 
Macphee G 2006 From reproduction to reproducibility: creativity and technics in 
Benjamin and Arendt Angelaki 11 65-74 
Marcus G E ed 1995 Technoscientific Imaginaries: Conversations, profiles and 
Memoirs University of Chicago Press, Chicago 
McKibben B 2003 Enough: Genetic Engineering and the End of Human Nature 
Bloomsbury, London 
Mody C 2006 Small, but determined: technological determinism in nanoscience in 
Schummer J and Baird D eds Nanotechnology Challenges: Implications for 
Philosophy, Ethics and Society World Scientific Publishing, Singapore 95-130 
National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) and Interagency Working 
Group on Nanoscience E a T I 2000 National Nanotechnology Initiative: 
Leading to the Next Industrial Revolution NSTC, Washington D.C. 
Nordmann A 2006 The future development of nanotechnology: historical 
development and global expansion. Unpublished paper. 
Nordmann A 2004 Molecular disjunctions: staking claims at the nanoscale. In Baird 
D, Nordmann A and Schummer J Discovering the Nanoscale IOS Press, 
Amsterdam. 
Petersson D 2005 Time and technology Environment and Planning D: Society and 
Space 23(2) 207–234 
Rabinow P and Rose N 2003 Thoughts on the concept of biopower today  
Rasmussen S, Liaohai C, Deamer D, Krakauer D C, Packard N H, Stadler P F 
and Bedau M A 2004 Transitions from nonliving to living matter Science 303 
5660 
Rheinberger H J 1997 Towards a History of Epistemic Things: Synthesizing Proteins 
in the Test Tube Stanford University Press, Stanford 
Rheinberger H J 2003 Scrips and scribbles MLN 118 622-36 
Rip A 2006 Folk theories about nanotechnologists Science as Culture 15(4) 349-365. 
Roco M C 1999 Nanoparticles and nanotechnology research Journal of Nanoparticle 
Research 1 1-6 
Roco M C and Bainbridge W S eds 2002 Converging Technologies for Improving 
Human Performance: Nanotechnology, Biotechnology, Information 
Technology and the Cognitive Science National Science Foundation, 
Arlington, VA 
Rose N 2001 The politics of life itself Theory, Culture & Society 18 1-30 
Schrödinger E 1944 What is Life? The Physical Aspect of the Living Cell Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 
Schwarz A E 2004 Shrinking the ecological footprint with nanotechnoscience? in 
Baird D, Nordmann A and Schummer J eds Discovering the Nanoscale 
IOS Press, Amsterdam 203-9 
 25 
                                                                                                                                            
Seeman N C and Belcher A M 2002 Emulating biology: building nanostructures 
from the bottom up Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 99 
6451-5 
Simondon G 1964 L’Individu et sa Genèse Physico-Biologique. Presses 
Universitaires de France, Paris. 
Simondon G 1992 The Genesis of the individual. In Crary, J. and Kwinter, S 
Incorporations Zone Books, New York. 
Smalley R 2001a Of chemistry, love and nanobots Scientific American 285 76-7 
Smalley R 2001b Smalley responds Chemical & Engineering News 81 39-40 
Smalley R 2003 Smalley concludes Chemical & Engineering News 81 41-2 
Spinoza B 1910 Ethics and On the Correction of the Understanding Dent, London 
Stengers I 1997 Power and Invention: Situating Science University of Minnesota 
Press, Minneapolis 
Stiegler B 1994 Technics and Time: The Fault of Epimetheus Stanford University 
Press, Stanford CA.  
Taniguchi N 1974 On the basic concept of ‘nano-technology'  Proceedings of the 
International Conference of Production Engineering Japan Society of 
Precision Engineering, Tokyo 18-23 
Van Lente H 1993 Promising technology: The dynamics of expectations in 
technological development, Twente University Pages 
Vision 2020 Technology Partnership 2003 Chemical Industry R&D Roadmap for 
Nanomaterials by Design: From Fundamentals to Function Vision 2020 
Technology Partnership, http://www.chemicalvision2020.org. 
von Neumann J 1961 Collected Works Pergamon Press, Oxford 
Waldby C 2002 Stem cells, tissue cultures and the production of biovalue Health: An 
Interdisciplinary Journal for the Social Study of Health, Illness and Medicine 
6 305-23 
Whitehead A N 1956 Adventures of Ideas, Macmillan, New York.  
Whitesides G M and Grzybowski B 2002 Self-assembly at all scales Science 295 
5564 
Wilsdon J and Willis R 2004 See-Through Science: Why Public Engagement Needs 
to Move Upstream Demos, London 
Wynne B 1982 Rationality and Ritual: The Windscape Inquiry and Nuclear 
Decisions in Britain British Society for the History of Science, Chalfont St 
Giles 
 
 
 
